Europe is still vitally important, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a foundational element of global security. Therefore, some in the administration have identified savings gained from the reduction of U.S. troops in a stable Europe, and by reducing United States' fiscal support to NATO, which is between 65 percent and 70 percent of total investments by all member countries. These arguments are compelling rationales for the decreased involvement or even withdrawal from both Europe and NATO. Though these very stark and legitimate drawbacks exist, the advantages gained from second and third order effects of alliance membership and European presence, in today's globalized and transnational world, cannot be understated. This paper acknowledges the need for a force drawdown in Europe, but contends accomplishment of this action should be through a decrease in service component, United States Army Europe (USAEUR) and United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), force structure while increasing overall NATO participation, and with a clear understanding of past, present and future regional and global strategic implications. Many, in political and military circles, acknowledged that alliance membership creates diplomatic, economic and internal U.S. military gains. However, in an ever-growing Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA) global environment, these gains must be weighed against fiscal constraints. Therefore, conceding the need for troop reductions in Europe as a cost saving measure, the most effective and efficient way to accomplish regional security and global stability is through continued and increased NATO involvement with operational and training commitments and headquarters staffing.
When adjusting long-standing policies, thorough assessments of the regional and global security environment, as well as, what portion of Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) elements of power require the greatest emphasis is crucial. The elements of power must link to current national foreign policy and the International Relations (IR) theory trends that presently and have guided those decisions. IR theory is the starting point for understanding the motivation behind an actor's actions, and policy negotiations with specific state or non-state entities. In relation to the United States' policy adjustments, on European force structure, an understanding of the current Obama administration's foreign policy, and that of previous U.S. governments leading to our present force structure are of noteworthy importance. Furthermore, by accepting a troop drawdown in Europe, U.S. policy makers must be cognizant of the domestic and international pressures put on our allies, how domestic audiences perceive the threats, both physical and economical, to national interests. Moreover, planners and policy makers must embrace the fact that war no longer equates to a simple military versus military dynamic, but that consideration of all the elements of power is critical to future negotiations and actions. Finally, through rigorous strategic analysis and a solid deliberation of today's American foreign policy, a coherent and effective policy to extend well into 2020 is possible.
To better understand the basics of IR theory it is essential to highlight separations within definitions; specifically focusing on realism and liberalism; however, acknowledging the host of other theories branch from these base ideas to form the whole of IR thinking and categorization. Realism is the first base theory, and it is the belief that "power and the distribution of power are the only important factors in was not overly successful, but it continues to press for something other than a strict realist policy to world.
The realist theory has been the mainstay of U.S. foreign policy for the last 60
years, but with the rise of globalism and transnational entities, it has become critical that a pluralistic approach to engagements become the centerpiece of the U.S. international policy. Again, the current administration is pursuing this approach, but actions are not matching the words. This multilateral approach closely aligns with liberalist theory.
"Liberal theory asserts the incidence of conflict and cooperation is determined by domestic politics (the political competition among different sub-state actors to influence state policy) and national interests which result in state policy preferences" 6 and that "international order originates from power, international society, and international law." 7 Furthermore, the liberal focus is "less on structure and the asymmetries of power Therefore, in the near future, credible international actors must become more adept in using the spectrum of national powers, in order to minimize the required use of the military arm of the DIME approach to international relations. A fully integrated DIME approach will decrease emphasis on the military component, which is over-stretched, and required to perform mission sets that are outside of designated expertise areas. 41 The assessment is considered medium to high risk due to the political sensitivities, especially with Russia, and initial cost make this an unfavorable option in the near/mid-term.
OPTION IV: Decrease U.S. Force Presence, But Increase in NATO Commitments
Bottom line up front, this is the best option, but recommend implementation be delayed until 2017 to allow U.S. and NATO consolidation actions to finalize in or around 2015, prior to any further adjustments to current force structure or troop distribution.
During the recent NATO ministerial conference, Secretary Clinton called NATO our strongest alliance and many of our relationships in Europe buttress on the agreement to collective defense. This alternative would call for "warm-basing" many current U.S.
facilities and inviting host nations to use designated portions of the base while preserving its capability as a staging location for U.S. assets. Unlike Option I, this is a burden sharing arrangement, which would provide facility utilization for U.S. personnel without the commitment required to maintain a full operational base complex. This choice also allows for cost reductions while maintaining strong alliance support.
Additionally, by encompassing U.S. troops on coalition bases there will be a decrease in the required support services provided by the U.S. military. Moreover, it highlights our continued commitment to our NATO allies and all of Europe through combined training, exercising and deployment events. Also, there will still be U.S. dollars flowing into the local economy which will make a troop drawdown easier for the local governments.
However, influential policy-makers, such as Representative Mike Coffman (R-CO), do not believe in maintaining current levels of investment in Europe and NATO. They cite that the U.S. provides approximately 75 percent of the funding for NATO activities.
"Only four of our 28 NATO allies are fulfilling their requirement under the NATO chapter to spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense because they rely far too heavily on the United States to provide for them." 42 This is in gross disproportion of the other NATO contributing nations. However, the USAREUR Commanding General, Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling provides an alternate view, "as the NATO intervention in Libya highlighted, future coalitions likely will be ad hoc and hastily assembled. Cooperation with European nations in peacetime is an important mission aimed at making future alliances more successful as threats arise." 43 General Hertling continues on to state that he "believes his troops play a key role in preventing future conflict, mainly by working directly with European partners on a day-to-day basis and training them to meet both present and future threats. We're actually…getting more "bang for the buck" by helping train our allies to fight alongside us." 44 Additionally, "many European ministers and diplomats, some from former Warsaw Pact countries who see the U.S. presence as reassurance against Russian intentions -had also argued strongly against further U.S. cuts." 45 However, three crucial detractors need addressing to ensure a strong alliance and continued U.S. support. To begin with, the NATO nations need to begin paying a more equitable portion of the overall funding bill. As former Secretary of Defense Gates said, "I am the latest in a string of U.S. defense secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defense spending. However, fiscal, political and demographic realities make this unlikely to happen anytime soon, as even military stalwarts like the U.K have ratcheted back capability with major cuts to force structure. Today, just five of 28 allies --the U.S., U.K., France, and Greece, along with Albania --exceed the agreed 2 percent of GDP spending on defense." 47 Now that Greece has had such excessive financial difficulties that list is also in danger of becoming smaller.
Second, all nations need to consider the implementation of national caveats.
National Afghanistan the resolution has had little to no effect. The national caveat discussion is a perfect example of alliance operations as a whole. The organization can give direction or place restrictions, however, the individual state's interests take precedence and ultimately determine adherence, or not, to the policies. Specifically, in Resolution 336 the second bullet highlights this issue; "recalling that national caveats may be both declared and known to commanders, or undeclared and therefore unknown to commanders until they actually assign a mission to a particular unit and discover that a caveat prevents that unit from performing that mission." 48 Because of some national caveats, operational effectiveness is impacted and all involved troops are potentially at risk. Caveats are an area that with a greater U.S. presence in NATO there is an opportunity to influence a more normative set of guidelines for the alliance, and greater adherence to organizational verses national rules of engagement. funds most of its international basing infrastructure and protection requirements.
However, under this revised construct within NATO, the U.S. would need to insist on host nations providing a majority of the infrastructure and protection support and funding. Due to current fiscal constraints in Europe and in the United States this could be a very contentious matter, but one that must be quickly resolved. This would allow the U.S. force structure to be less "tail" and more "tooth" in its make-up. Furthermore, this would allow for greater training and exercise capabilities since most administrative functions require unit support provided by host nation entities.
These three points are important to consider, but the value added to the U.S. and the individual member greatly overshadows any negatives related to increased alliance support. In fact, Lt Gen Mark Hertling stated that the Army facilitates "about 8,000
security cooperation events a year -everything from participation by individual soldiers to establishing liaisons with foreign command headquarters and helping them with operations. As U.S. participation in the hot wars of Iraq and Afghanistan begins to cool, the Army in Europe should focus on building international partnerships and trust as a means to preventing future wars." 49 He goes on to state that any further reduction from current manning levels will inhibit his ability to provide this comprehensive level of support. However, an increase in NATO support would compensate for reductions in "stand alone" U.S. troop levels. Furthermore, this international interaction will help to produce a more diverse, in both thought and experience, military member who is more intellectually ready to engage in the ever-increasing VUCA global environment. specifically, the ability to rapidly spread messages or ideals over great distances and to diverse audiences in an unrestricted and uncensored manner. This phenomenon has led to the redistribution of global power and influence, which were previously the sanctuary of only the strongest few world actors. Over the past few decades, that power base has liberally spread to include as many as 20 powerful nations, also known as the G20. 53 However, in the first decade of the 21 st century, the influence has further distributed to regional actors, numerically insignificant Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Trans-National Corporations (TNCs).
Ultimately, this all ties together because in this VUCA environment, where a further drawdown U.S. force in Europe is inevitable, there are significant implications attached to the decreasing presence in Europe, diplomatically, economically and militarily. The use of a specific element and approach will influence the situation through not just direct effects, but through subsequent second and third order effects.
With globalization and growth of transnational non-state actors, the ability to understand and use the Comprehensive Approach is becoming a necessity, and experience in a multi-national organization is the perfect educational opportunity for future leaders.
Education in the application of the Comprehensive Approach will allow the future leader to "employ a complex blend of means that include the orchestration of diplomacy, political interaction, humanitarian aid, social pressures, economic development, savvy use of the media and military force." 54 Moreover, an increased presence in this international environment where guidelines and norms are established allows for greater professional development of the individuals assigned to the organization. In addition to providing an enhanced career path for military and civilian leaders, it would also lead to a greater expertise in operating in the international and interagency realms.
However, this will require all services to increase the value of young officers and NCOs operating in such a diverse and educational setting, and a willingness to use their skillsets in non-traditional assignments.
Furthermore, increasing NATO interaction and operations would provide significant benefits, as well as cost savings by employing these individuals in planning and strategy positions across the services. However, because the future security environment remains uncertain at best, and although planners and policy makers put great thought and preparation into future military actions, the inextricable linkages between people and global actions makes factual predictions nearly impossible.
Therefore, one major potential benefit is a substantial increase in unity of effort across all the instruments of power from all alliance members, through all phases of an operation. Most significantly, the expanded breadth of possibilities would result in greater pre-conflict operations on a coalition level, and fewer overall kinetic actions.
Furthermore, development of "coalitions of the willing" or "pods" of influence that are created from the greater organization can apply significant pressure upon global situations, typically more than unilateral engagement. These "pods" have considerably more "power" capability than any single nation operating on its own accord. In addition, some assert that U.S. power has begun to wane, and more importantly, the acceptance of U.S. power and policy definitely has been questioned following the predominatelyunilateral actions in Iraq. Therefore, having the consensus of the alliance or a coalition of the alliance lends greater credibility to our national actions, but also allows for differing views and potentially different approaches to solve difficult problems. An example of this would be to use other NATO members to work closely with Russia to ensure solid Russia-NATO relations, and warming interactions between Russia and the United States. This appears to be the direction the current administration wishes to proceed. President Obama made the following statement when preparing to present the American people with the planned troop increase for Afghanistan, "I want to say in the speech why this is not Vietnam, why this is not Iraq." 55 The President wanted to emphasize that in Afghanistan, unlike Vietnam, the U.S. was part of a strong coalition with over 48 nations supporting operations.
The presidential quote is important because it recognizes the changing face of world relations and perceptions. Additionally, it acknowledges that alliances and especially NATO are now more important than anytime over the last 60 years. Some continue to contend that alliances and specifically NATO were more relevant during the Cold War, but with the hybrid threats and transnational organizations freely moving about the globe, it is arguable that this is where shared capabilities and common interests will provide the greatest benefit to the U.S., as well as global security. This is particularly true when considering the drawdown of U.S. troops in Europe, and the need for maintaining a presence in this crucial theater of operations. Europe continues to be a crossroad for hybrid threats affecting the United States, such as criminal organizations, cyber attacks, terrorism, and High North 56 issues. There is no denying that the U.S. is still the world leading power, but there is also no hiding that globalization and transnational organizations have changed the face of the global security environment. Furthermore, this changing security situation has made it an imperative for the U.S. to maintain a presence on a global scale, and strengthening historic alliances and partnerships is the appropriate first action.
Finally, considering current fiscal constraints and world perceptions of American intentions, it is best to approach future global engagements through greater influence in international organizations with a multilateral face. European countries are acutely aware of the constraints and challenges within their borders and they have begun to reevaluate national and NATO military contributions. However, they also understand that most threats to their sovereignty and regional security come from outside the combined borders of greater Europe. These nations realize, and so must the U.S., that a symbiotic union is necessary for the purpose of greater European, Northern Atlantic, and global combined security and defense. Finally, it is important to remember, "as long as the American flag and the American soldier is present, the symbolism of solidarity is there." 57 Through a strengthened position in NATO, American presence in Europe will not only be assured, but will allow the U.S. to effectively and efficiently employ all elements of power needed to ensure continued global leadership while allowing our allies to lead operations when required, as in Libya 
